u F{W {Ncz-`/sMg
9FaEt X The proposal does not outline how the election of a new director will contribute to maximizing the DAO's profit or growing its treasury. Therefore, it does not align with the delegate's stated preference towards ensuring funds are used to get more funds and maximize the DAO's profit. There is also no clear indication of the nominated director's ROI potential or vision towards the DAO's sustainability and growth.
u F{W {Ncz-`/sMg
9FaEt X As a delegate with a strong preference towards guaranteeing the use of funds towards improving the quality and usability of the ENS protocol, I do not find sufficient information in the provided proposal about the candidates' commitment towards development efforts and protocol improvement. Also, the proposal does not violate any rules of the constitution. Therefore, I choose to abstain.
u F{W {Ncz-`/sMg
9FaEt X }The delegate description does not provide any preferences when it comes to selecting a new director for the ENS Foundation. My main mandate is to support public goods projects that create open-source, accessible software/products benefiting the ENS ecosystem. The election of a new director, while important, is not directly related to this mandate; therefore, I choose to abstain.
u F{W {Ncz-`/sMg
9FaEt X !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` _ii `.I ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' .**1 Election of new ENS Foundation director Abstract** This is a vote to elect a new director of the ENS Foundation. **Motivation** Brantly Millegan has communicated that he would like to resign as a director of the ENS Foundation. Brantly's resignation will take effect following the appointment of a new director by the DAO. The DAO may appoint a new director of the ENS Foundation pursuant to Article 15 of the Articles of Association of the ENS Foundation. **Specification** The DAO will vote to appoint one new director of the ENS Foundation. Two candidates are seeking election after successfully completing the requirements outlined in the 'Call for Nominees' post on the ENS Governance forum. The candidates seeking election are: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande The candidate with the highest number of votes above quorum will be appointed as a director of the ENS Foundtion following the completion of mandatory KYC checks. **Voting** This vote is a single choice vote. You may vote for one of the following options: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande None of the above Abstain By voting for a named candidate, you are voting in favor of appointing that candidate as a director of the ENS Foundat
fsfkwF@,2jZ*/ Q<2F#% ) i Nujp !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` _F _]& ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' -**Election of new ENS Foundation director Abstract** This is a vote to elect a new director of the ENS Foundation. **Motivation** Brantly Millegan has communicated that he would like to resign as a director of the ENS Foundation. Brantly's resignation will take effect following the appointment of a new director by the DAO. The DAO may appoint a new director of the ENS Foundation pursuant to Article 15 of the Articles of Association of the ENS Foundation. **Specification** The DAO will vote to appoint one new director of the ENS Foundation. Two candidates are seeking election after successfully completing the requirements outlined in the 'Call for Nominees' post on the ENS Governance forum. The candidates seeking election are: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande The candidate with the highest number of votes above quorum will be appointed as a director of the ENS Foundation following the completion of mandatory KYC checks. **Voting** This vote is a single choice vote. You may vote for one of the following options: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande None of the above Abstain By voting for a named candidate, you are voting in favor of appointing that candidate as a director of the ENS Foundat
lwO,x?
A0qhSU5C sv=jkGx1 !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` _; _] ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' .**Election of new ENS Foundation director Abstract** This is a vote to elect a new director of the ENS Foundation. **Motivation** Brantly Millegan has communicated that he would like to resign as a director of the ENS Foundation. Brantly's resignation will take effect following the appointment of a new director by the DAO. The DAO may appoint a new director of the ENS Foundation pursuant to Article 15 of the Articles of Association of the ENS Foundation. **Specification** The DAO will vote to appoint one new director of the ENS Foundation. Two candidates are seeking election after successfully completing the requirements outlined in the 'Call for Nominees' post on the ENS Governance forum. The candidates seeking election are: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande The candidate with the highest number of votes above quorum will be appointed as a director of the ENS Foundation following the completion of mandatory KYC checks. **Voting** This vote is a single choice vote. You may vote for one of the following options: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande None of the above Abstain By voting for a named candidate, you are voting in favor of appointing that candidate as a director of the ENS Foundati
RD_|.`g>@(Vyf0+*}] U^3=4aM j` {Justification: This is a governance vote about the election of a new ENS Foundation director, not directly a funding decision for a public goods project. However, the election of directors is an important governance action that indirectly influences the strategy and future decisions of the DAO. Given the candidates' commitment to uphold the principles outlined in the ENS constitution and the provenance of both nominees within the crypto and open source ecosystems, this vote aids in ensuring the DAO's continual adherence to its constitutional mission. Thus, I align with this proposal within the scope of the delegate description.
RD_|.`g>@(Vyf0+*}] U^3=4aM ' GJustification: As assumed for the purpose of this simulation, the entity I represent promotes protocol improvements. Reviewing the presented proposal, the election of a new director for the ENS Foundation directly relates to the functioning and improvement of the protocol. By participating in electing a director whose views align with the institutional objectives, it would provide an opportunity to bring about desired advancements to the ENS system. Since the constitution does not offer guidance specific to this query, the entity votes 'yes' based on its strategic inclination.
RD_|.`g>@(Vyf0+*}] U^3=4aM u0 rThe election of a new director for the ENS Foundation aligns with the strategy of finding ways to increase the DAO's profitability and treasury growth. While it's not a direct investment, having a competent director such as Sean Murray or Alex Van de Sande can help drive the DAO towards decisions and strategies that would be financially beneficial for the ENS governance. Both candidates seem qualified and their election could potentially have a positive influence on the DAO's financial growth.
RD_|.`g>@(Vyf0+*}] U^3=4aM !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` _ _]r ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' /**Election of new ENS Foundation director Abstract** This is a vote to elect a new director of the ENS Foundation. **Motivation** Brantly Millegan has communicated that he would like to resign as a director of the ENS Foundation. Brantly's resignation will take effect following the appointment of a new director by the DAO. The DAO may appoint a new director of the ENS Foundation pursuant to Article 15 of the Articles of Association of the ENS Foundation. **Specification** The DAO will vote to appoint one new director of the ENS Foundation. Two candidates are seeking election after successfully completing the requirements outlined in the 'Call for Nominees' post on the ENS Governance forum. The candidates seeking election are: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande The candidate with the highest number of votes above quorum will be appointed as a director of the ENS Foundation following the completion of mandatory KYC checks. **Voting** This vote is a single choice vote. You may vote for one of the following options: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande None of the above Abstain By voting for a named candidate, you are voting in favor of appointing that candidate as a director of the ENS Foundatio
1hOK+D[ar:kY}3j!<FU U+l WK a !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` _ _]c ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' 0**Election of new ENS Foundation director Abstract** This is a vote to elect a new director of the ENS Foundation. **Motivation** Brantly Millegan has communicated that he would like to resign as a director of the ENS Foundation. Brantly's resignation will take effect following the appointment of a new director by the DAO. The DAO may appoint a new director of the ENS Foundation pursuant to Article 15 of the Articles of Association of the ENS Foundation. **Specification** The DAO will vote to appoint one new director of the ENS Foundation. Two candidates are seeking election after successfully completing the requirements outlined in the 'Call for Nominees' post on the ENS Governance forum. The candidates seeking election are: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande The candidate with the highest number of votes above quorum will be appointed as a director of the ENS Foundation following the completion of mandatory KYC checks. **Voting** This vote is a single choice vote. You may vote for one of the following options: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande None of the above Abstain By voting for a named candidate, you are voting in favor of appointing that candidate as a director of the ENS Foundatio.
|/tu "ih==L+K3q2[^ ~5N!t:y4E CP $As a delegate, my primary focus is funding public goods projects that create openly accessible software and products that are open source. This proposal does not provide enough information about the candidates' commitment or plans towards such projects. More information is needed about the candidates to evaluate their alignment with this objective. The election of a director is important, but it doesn't directly pertain to my strong preference toward funding these projects. Therefore, based on the available information, I abstain from voting.
|/tu "ih==L+K3q2[^ ~5N!t:y4E CP This proposal directly contributes to improving the protocol by appointing a new director who would steer ENS development and improvements. It adheres to Article III of the constitution, ensuring the long-term viability of ENS by promoting continuous development. The candidates, having gone through a vetting process, are expected to uphold the principles outlined in the constitution in their role.
|/tu "ih==L+K3q2[^ ~5N!t:y4E u0 ]As a delegate focused on ensuring profits and sustainability of the DAO's investments, this proposal does not provide enough financial information regarding the potential impact of the new director on the financial growth of the DAO. While leadership is crucial, clearer connections need to be made to the profit and sustainability goals of the DAO.
|/tu "ih==L+K3q2[^ ~5N!t:y4E !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` \!S \f3 ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' 1**Election of new ENS Foundation director Abstract** This is a vote to elect a new director of the ENS Foundation. **Motivation** Brantly Millegan has communicated that he would like to resign as a director of the ENS Foundation. Brantly's resignation will take effect following the appointment of a new director by the DAO. The DAO may appoint a new director of the ENS Foundation pursuant to Article 15 of the Articles of Association of the ENS Foundation. **Specification** The DAO will vote to appoint one new director of the ENS Foundation. Two candidates are seeking election after successfully completing the requirements outlined in the 'Call for Nominees' post on the ENS Governance forum. The candidates seeking election are: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande The candidate with the highest number of votes above quorum will be appointed as a director of the ENS Foundation following the completion of mandatory KYC checks. **Voting** This vote is a single choice vote. You may vote for one of the following options: Sean Murray Alex Van de Sande None of the above Abstain By voting for a named candidate, you are voting in favor of appointing that candidate as a director of the ENS Foundation.
}%8Cp@tRJNW(0 +hK`d BS-0^M%_
The proposal aligns with the ENS DAO constitution, specifically article III. As this proposal aims to secure financial stability for the DAO, it ensures the long-term viability of ENS and the ability to continue development work. Moreover, it does not infringe on any of the non-permissible activities outlined in the ENS DAO constitution. This decision should mitigate the DAOb s financial risk associated with the volatile nature of ETH, ensuring steady work on public goods projects as prioritized by my delegate mandate.
}%8Cp@tRJNW(0 +hK`d BS-0^M%_ QThe proposal to convert a portion of the DAO's treasury from ETH to USDC gives stability to the DAO's operational funds. This introduces more predictability to the budget and mitigates the risk of fluctuations in the value of the treasury. This strategy aligns with the delegate preference of maximizing DAO's profit and efficiently growing its treasury. Ensuring the DAO's operational sustainability can also be seen as an investment in its continuity and success.
}%8Cp@tRJNW(0 +hK`d BS-0^M%_ CP tThe proposal is in alignment with ENS DAO Constitution's principles of ensuring long-term viability and continuous development and improvement of the ENS system. The decision to diversify assets by converting a portion of the treasury from ETH to USDC will reduce exposure to volatility risks and secure the operational resources for the envisioned period. This approach enhances financial security and sustainability, which are crucial for the DAO's function and the potential protocol improvements.
}%8Cp@tRJNW(0 +hK`d BS-0^M%_ !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [+ \W ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' **Sell ETH to USDC | Abstract** This proposal executes a swap of 10,000 ETH into USDC, to ensure ENS DAO has enough to cover operating expenses for 18-24 months. **Motivation** The DAO currently keeps almost 100% of its spendable treasury in ETH. While ENS generates protocol revenue in ETH, having so much exposure to a single volatile asset places the DAO in a vulnerable position. This is a proposal to convert 10,000 ETH into USDC through a Cowswap swap. 10,000 ETH is approximately 25% of the total amount of ETH held by the ENS DAO (wallet.ensdao.eth) and register controller (controller.ens.eth) as of January 18, 2023. It is hoped that this sale will generate in excess of $13m in USDC. The goal is to ensure that the DAO has enough USDC to cover operations for the next 18-24 months.
l ,d<Ki K?eJ.E$Ku_P*
# %$UxQ ^ CP ,I support this proposal because it aligns perfectly with the ENS DAO constitution. It seeks to improve and grow the ENS ecosystem, which goes along with Article III, emphasizing that generated income first ensures the long-term viability of ENS, funds continuing development, and enhances the ENS system. This proposal does not contradict any of the constitution's articles. Therefore, my vote is a Yes for protocol improvement.
l ,d<Ki K?eJ.E$Ku_P*
# %$UxQ ^ !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [e \VE ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' \**Funding Request: ENS Ecosystem Working Group Abstract** The ENS Ecosystem Working Group requests funding of 935,000 USDC and 254 ETH from the ENS DAO for Q1/Q2 2023. The ENS Ecosystem Working Group is responsible for growing and improving the ENS Ecosystem by funding people and projects that are ENS-specific or ENS-centric. In line with Article III of the ENS DAO Constitution, the requested funds will be used to support projects and builders contributing to the development and improvement of the ENS protocol and the ENS ecosystem. This social proposal is submitted to satisfy the requirements set out in Rule 10.1.1 of the Working Group Rules (EP 1.8). If this proposal is passed, the funding request will be included in a collective executable proposal put forward by all three Working Groups. **Specification** USDC ETH $ENS ENS Ecosystem Multisig 935,000 254 - **Description** ENS Ecosystem Multisig Balance The ENS Ecosystem Working Group is requesting 935,000 USDC, 254 ETH, and 0 $ENS. The ENS Ecosystem Working Group currently has 879,982 USDC, 110 ETH, and 40,936 $ENS in its multisigs. If this funding request is approved, the ENS Ecosystem Working Group multisigs will have a total of 1,814,982 USDC, 364 ETH, and 40,936 $ENS.
lF mx%k7}JG-7S%AsgZHI3YoC[V
CP The proposal aligns with Article III of the constitution which states that the generated income should first ensure the long-term viability and continuous development of the ENS. The creation of the ENS Endowment clearly aligns with this directive, as it aims to sustain the operations of the ENS even in adverse economic situations. Moreover, decision-making is being fairly put up to a DAO vote, further adhering to the principles of decentralized governance. Consequently, my vote is in favor of this proposal.
lF mx%k7}JG-7S%AsgZHI3YoC[V
!~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [[ \V; ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' {Selection of an ENS endowment fund manager Abstract Following the RFP process approved in EP2.2.4, the Meta-Governance Working Group stewards have selected a short list of potential fund managers for the DAO to elect to manage the ENS Endowment. Specification EP2.2.4 set out a process for fund managers to submit proposals to the Meta-Governance Working Group for consideration as fund managers over an ENS Endowment. The Endowment's goal is to ensure the long-term viability of ENS by ensuring it can meet its ongoing financial obligations even in the face of reduced ETH price and registration/renewal revenue. Eight submissions were made as a result of the RFP process, and the stewards have narrowed this down to three finalists. All three finalists are established actors with track records of fund management, and their proposals reflect an understanding of the low-risk, long-term sustainability approach that an endowment should take. Rather than select a winner themselves, the Meta-Governance Working Group Stewards believe that the selection of a fund manager should be put to the DAO. This EP implements a Snapshot vote using Ranked Choice voting with the following options: Avantgarde Karpatkey Llama None of the above Submissions for the vote are listed in alphabetical order. Following the conclusion of the vote, the Meta-Governance Stewards will work with the winning team to develop an initial treasury allocation strategy, resulting in a separate executable proposal to enact the initial setup of the endowment.
Hx2 [Iiw>}&D]N.' $&P"?EK! !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [I \V) ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' bENS Endaoment RFP Overview The DAO is seeking a fund manager to manage an endowment fund. This fund will be established from some combination of current treasury and ongoing revenue and will exist to insulate the DAO from economic fluctuations, ensuring it can continue its core operations regardless of the wider economic outlook. Funds will be drawn from the DAO's general funds, currently held in ETH and USDC, as well as from ongoing DAO revenue until the fund reaches its target size. Proposals should outline how much of the DAO's current funds they intend to appropriate, as well as what proportion of ongoing revenue will be required, and for how long. The DAO's accounting basis divides assets into earned and unearned income. Unearned income corresponds to funds paid for registrations and renewals that are future-dated; for example, if a user spends $100 to register a name for 20 years, after a year $5 of that will be counted as earned income and the remainder as unearned income. Unearned income may be incorporated into the fund but must be risk-neutral with regard to ETH. Earned income should be risk-neutral with regard to USDC. The DAO's current balances can be viewed here; as of this writing they are: 13,069 ETH (~$20M) in earned income, $3,817,067 USDC, 18,184 ETH (~$20M) in unearned income. Scope of Work Expand the endowment structure specified in the accepted proposal into an executable form. Work with the ENS Meta-Governance stewards to refine the proposal. Implement the proposal onchain. Administer and adjust the endowment as necessary on an ongoing basis. Selection Criteria The endowment will need to be able to sustain annual withdrawals of at least $4M USDC without a long-term reduction in principal. Proposals should include, at a minimum: Intended high-level fund allocation of the endowment. Initial and target size for the endowment fund, including the proportion of funds sourced from earned and unearned income. How incoming revenues and income will be assigned to the fund. Specific information on how the fund will be managed, and what steps will be taken to minimise custodial risk. A fee schedule for the fund manager. A detailed description of the reporting structures that will be put in place. Priority will be given to proposals that: Minimise custodial risk by using onchain mechanisms that allow administration of the funds without the fund administrator having custody of the funds. Lay out a coherent strategy for how investment returns can be maintained in the short/medium/long term. Minimise capital risks relative to the expected returns. Define clear mechanisms for assessment and adjustment to changing external and internal conditions in order to continue to meet the endowment's objectives. Offer a high rate of return proportional to risk. Define a clear reporting structure for frequent and comprehensive reporting of the fund's status to the DAO.
GvFJTGEi-?~YA@UoUw0!;gjuZMj !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [t \UT ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' )Funding True Names Ltd Note: This was previously numbered EP14. Abstract True Names Ltd (TNL) developed the Ethereum Name Service (ENS) protocol, continues to manage the development of the ENS Protocol and solely focuses on this project. Incubated at the Ethereum Foundation in 2017, TNL spun out in 2018 with the charge of designing and deploying THE next generation naming service. TNL is now a growing team of web3 enthusiasts from across the globe working together to support the ENS Ecosystem that now has a passionate community that has registered over 1 million ENS names and uses more than 500 integrations. In 2021, TNL initiated the creation of the ENS DAO with the goal of 1) furthering the development of the ENS Protocol and 2) funding public goods projects. In consideration of the work completed thus far this calendar year and the work in the months and years to come, per Article III of the ENS Constitution, True Names Ltd respectfully requests an evergreen grant stream that will allow the organization to continue the development and improvement of the ENS Protocol. For Calendar Year 2022, this request will amount to $4,197,500 USDC which is equivalent to a daily stream of $11,500 USDC. In Q1 of each year, TNL or the ENS DAO may make requests to alter and/or terminate this evergreen grant stream.
)Nm~%D'5=7t=.I hG JUnpZXrb !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [M \U- ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' 0Fund the Protocol Guild pilot with 200,000 $ENS Note: This was previously numbered EP13. Abstract We propose that 200k ENS (~3.7% of the unclaimed airdrop) be allocated in recognition of past and ongoing work of these core contributors. ENS is one of the most successful projects built on Ethereum, and yet core protocol contributors do not benefit in any way from the success of projects being built on Ethereum. The Protocol Guild provides a vehicle for the ENS community to distribute governance tokens to those individuals who build and maintain the foundational infrastructure that ENS relies on. ENS sponsorship of the Guild allows members to engage with ENS in a way that is values- and incentive-aligned. Simultaneously, it will allow them to continue the important work of scaling our shared infrastructure and making it as resilient as possible for the applications on top of it. Specification Useful links Protocol Guild Docs 1 Year Vesting Contract Split Contract Initial Announcement - Dec 2021 List of Members Protocol Guild twitter Context As a credibly neutral, maximally uncapturable infrastructure with no block reward, the Ethereum base protocol doesn't offer the same token incentives to contributors as applications or L2s can. However, the protocol still needs to attract and retain talent to continue to evolve. As the broader ecosystem continues to grow, competition for talented individuals will only increase. This isn't to fault individuals for rationally weighting financial incentives, or protocols for leveraging the power of tokens - this is just the reality of the current context. We also acknowledge that financial motivations aren't the only or best motivator for people, it's just one tool in our toolset that is currently underleveraged. Existing public goods funding solutions tend to be either too narrow or broad in scope, fail to exclusively target core protocol contributors, or depend on an intermediating institution, which often leads to organizations, and not individuals, being recipients of funds. The Protocol benefits from contributor continuity.
]Ec?2Cj>onk'6WOO'Ro 8K))k" mThe proposal is favoring the protocol improvements and adding the roles and responsibilities that will aid in a more efficient and effective management of the working group operations. The creation of the new entity, DAO Secretary, streamlines the administrative processes across working groups. Addition of a Lead Steward guides better in navigating the operations within each group. This leads to overall productivity and ensures the proposal is in line with the governance and constitution.
]Ec?2Cj>onk'6WOO'Ro 8K))k" !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [y! \> ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' )'Working Group Rules | Note: This was previously numbered EP12. Abstract This is a proposal to repeal the working group rules passed in EP4 and replace those rules with working group rules specified in this proposal for the Second Term of 2022 and all Terms thereafter. The working group rules specified in this proposal add more details about Steward responsibilities and the management of working group funds, as well as introducing the requirement of each working group to appoint a lead steward. The specification below also introduces a rule to appoint a new DAO Secretary, responsible for managing working relationships and communications across working groups as well as performing administrative duties for the DAO. Specification Working Groups Rules Formation of Working Groups To create a new working group, a social proposal, as defined by the ENS governance documentation (b Social Proposalb ), must be put forward and passed by the DAO. A Social Proposal to create a new working group must demonstrate that the new working group is needed and the work cannot be undertaken within an existing working group. Dissolution of Working Groups A working group can be dissolved by passing a Social Proposal requesting the dissolution of a working group or working groups. If an active proposal is put forward to dissolve a working group, all working group funds, including outgoing payments, within that working group, are to be frozen with immediate effect, pending the outcome of that vote. Upon the dissolution of a working group, any and all unspent working group funds from that working group, at the time of dissolution, must be immediately returned to the DAO treasury, without delay. Working Group Stewards Each working group shall be managed by three stewards (hereafter a b Stewardb or b Stewardsb ). Stewards will be elected to serve within working groups for a set period of time (hereafter known as a b Termb or b Termsb ). There are two Terms each calendar year: The first Term commences at 9am UTC on January 1 each year and ends immediately prior to the commencement of the second Term (b First Termb ); and The second Term commences at 9am UTC on July 1 each year and ends immediately prior to the commencement of the First Term of the following year (b Second Termb ). Stewards are responsible for overseeing the operation of working groups in accordance with these rules and the ENS DAO constitution. The responsibilities of Stewards include, but are not limited to: Requesting working group funds from the DAO in accordance with these rules; Approving the creation of sub-groups or workstreams within a working group to undertake work and/or carry out specific projects or tasks; Dissolving sub-groups or workstreams within a working group; Using discretion to make working group funds available to sub-groups, workstreams, or contributors within a working group; Using discretion to disburse working group funds to people and/or projects in accordance with the ENS DAO constitution; and Acting as keyholders of working group multi-sigs. Steward Eligibility and Nominations Any individual is eligible to nominate themselves to be a Steward of a working group within the DAO (b Eligible Personb or b Eligible Personsb ). To be eligible to be included in the ballot for First Term elections of a given year, Eligible Persons must nominate themselves between 9am UTC on December 6 and 9am UTC on December 9 (b First Term Nomination Windowb ). To be eligible to be included in the ballot for Second Term elections of a given year, Eligible Persons must nominate themselves between 9am UTC on June 6 and 9am UTC on June 9 (b Second Term Nomination Windowb ). An Eligible Person may nominate themselves to become a Steward of a working group or working groups during the First Term Nomination Window or the Second Term Nomination Window (each a b Nomination Windowb ), by meeting the requirements set out in a call for nominations posted in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum. An Eligible Person who completes the steps outlined in rule 4.4 above during a Nomination Window and receives 10,000 signed votes to support their nomination will be included in the ballot as a nominee in the election for Stewards that takes place following that Nomination Window (b Nomineeb ). Steward Elections Elections for working group Stewards for the First Term of a given year will take place by a vote of governance token holders using signed messages and will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on December 10 each year (b First Term Election Windowb ). Elections for working group Stewards for the Second Term of a given year will take place by a vote of governance token holders using signed messages and will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on June 10 each year (b Second Term Election Windowb ). The top-ranked Nominees from each working group vote held during a First Term Election Window or a Second Term Election Window (each an 'Election Window'), will fill any available positions for the role of Steward for those working groups for the Term immediately following an Election Window, based on the order in which they are ranked in each working group vote. A Nominee elected to serve as a Steward may not take up the role of Steward for more than two working groups during a single Term. Delay of Nominations or Elections In the event that nominations or elections for Stewards take place after a Nomination Window or after an Election Window, the nomination process and/or elections shall take place, as otherwise prescribed in rules 4 and 5 above, as soon as is practicable after the missed Nomination Window or missed Election Window. In the event that an election takes place outside of an Election Window and after the commencement date of a new Term, outgoing Stewards from the previous Term shall stay in their positions as working group Stewards until immediately prior to 9am UTC the day following the end of the election, which, for the avoidance of doubt, is 120 hours after voting in those elections commenced. In the event that an election takes place outside of an Election Window and after the commencement date of a new Term, newly elected Stewards will assume the responsibilities of stewardship within working groups at 9am UTC the day following the end of the election, as defined in rule 6.2 above, for the remainder of that Term. Removal and Replacement of Stewards Stewards may be removed at any time by: a Social Proposal passed by the DAO; or a simple indicative majority vote among Stewards of all working groups, with the outcome of that vote communicated in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum. Stewards may step down from their position at any time by communicating their intention to step down in the ENS governance forum. In the event that a Steward is removed, steps down, or is unable to continue as a Steward, for whatever reason, prior to the end of a Term, a new election must be held to fill any vacant Steward positions, in accordance with rule 6 above. Lead Stewards Each working group must appoint a lead Steward within the first five days of a Term (hereafter a 'Lead Steward' or 'Lead Stewards'). Only current elected Stewards of a working group are eligible to serve as Lead Stewards within a given working group. Lead Stewards may be appointed or removed from that role at any time by a simple indicative majority vote among the Stewards of a working group, with the outcome of that vote communicated in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum. In the event that a Lead Steward steps down from the position or is removed as a Lead Steward before the end of a Term in accordance with rule 8.3 above, a new Lead Steward must be appointed within five calendar days. A Steward who is appointed to serve as a Lead Steward of a working group will remain in that position, as Lead Steward, from the date of appointment until the end of their elected Term as a Steward or until they are removed as a Lead Steward in accordance with rule 8.3 above or until they are removed as a Steward in accordance with rule 7 above. Lead Stewards are responsible for the operational management and administration of working groups and are expected to provide regular updates to the DAO in the ENS governance forum related to working group progress, achievements, and challenges. The responsibilities of Lead Stewards include, but are not limited to: Acting as a representative of a working group; Managing resource requests from sub-groups, workstreams, and contributors within a working group; Initiating the disbursement of working group funds on an as-needed basis; Providing reports of working group spending in the ENS governance forum; and Maintaining open communications with DAO participants in the ENS governance forum. DAO Secretary At the start of each Term, the current Stewards of each working group shall collaborate to appoint an individual who will serve as the secretary of the DAO (hereafter 'Secretary' or 'Secretaries'). The Secretary may be appointed or removed from that role at any time by a majority vote of all elected Stewards in a given Term with the outcome of that vote communicated in the ENS governance forum. The Secretary will remain in that position, as Secretary of the DAO, from the date of appointment until the end of a given Term or until the date at which they are removed from that position in accordance with rule 9.2 above. Secretaries are eligible to receive fair compensation for their work as Secretary of the DAO. Compensation for the Secretary of the DAO is to be paid by the Meta-Governance Working Group using funds requested in accordance with rule 10 below. Any individual is eligible to be appointed as the Secretary of the DAO, including past and present working group Stewards. The Secretary is responsible for managing working relationships and communications across working groups as well as performing administrative duties for the DAO. The responsibilities of the Secretary include, but are not limited to: Managing a DAO-wide calendar; Coordinating and attending working group meetings where possible and ensuring meeting summaries are posted in the ENS governance forum; Assisting Stewards with coordination challenges within working groups; and Acting as a multi-sig keyholder for each working group. Working Group Funds To request working group funds, Stewards of all working groups will collaborate
[z}yJb
0M_+B,<xue ;[N "j= oGiven the constitution's focus on continuous development and improvement of the ENS system, ending the $ENS and EP2 airdrops can potentially deter the incentives for users to participate and improve the system. The airdrops can serve as an incentive mechanism and potentially fund additional improvements. Hence, this proposal might hamper the protocol's advancement.
[z}yJb
0M_+B,<xue ;[N "j= !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [y \>w ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' hEnd the $ENS and EP2 airdrops Note: This was previously numbered EP11. Abstract The $ENS airdrop can be terminated at any time on or after May 4, 2022 by a call from the DAO, transferring remaining tokens to an address it specifies. The EP2 airdrop can be terminated at any time by revoking the token approval given to it by the DAO. This EP proposes to execute both of these actions on or shortly after May 4, 2022. Specification Call 'sweep' on the ENS token contract, specifying the DAO wallet as target address. Call 'approve' on the ENS token contract, specifying the EP2 airdrop contract and an allowance of 0.
dFdPxU*%N1
&2;><ijFV`w6|m' !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [yy \>Y ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' Working Group Funding Abstract -> This proposal executes all three Working Group funding requests for Q1/Q2 2023 as passed in EP 3.1.1, EP 3.1.2, and EP 3.1.3. For more detail, view the ENS Governance docs or view the links below. Motivation EP 3.1.1 b ENS Ecosystem Working Group The ENS Ecosystem Working Group requests funding of 935,000 USDC and 254 ETH from the ENS DAO for Q1/Q2 2023. The ENS Ecosystem Working Group is responsible for growing and improving the ENS Ecosystem by funding people and projects that are ENS-specific or ENS-centric. In line with Article III of the ENS DAO Constitution, the requested funds will be used to support projects and builders contributing to the development and improvement of the ENS protocol and the ENS ecosystem. EP 3.1.2 b MetaGovernance Working Group The Meta-Governance Working Group requests funding of 364,000 USDC, 125 ETH, and 3,500 $ENS from the ENS DAO for Q1/Q2 2023. This MetaGovernance Working Group will use this funding to support the governance processes of the ENS DAO as well as manage and build infrastructure to support the ENS DAO and Working Groups. EP 3.1.3 b Public Goods Working Group The Public Goods Working Group requests funding of 250,000 USDC and 50 ETH from the ENS DAO for Q1/Q2 2023. The Public Goods Working Group will be use this funding to support projects and builders as provisioned by Article III of the ENS DAO Constitution, which provides for the funding of public goods in web3. Specification Transfer 935,000 USDC and 254 ETH to ens-ecosystem.pod.xyz Transfer 364,000 USDC, 125 ETH, and 3,500 $ENS to ens-metagov.pod.xyz Transfer 250,000 USDC and 50 ETH to ens-publicgoods.pod.xyz
3us;;J
oA+S| %)|2X2@f]HuX ' !~qCt+mH<}`SLVt#.o ` [x` \=@ ` )yULD#z2 rS4%m R' FSet the temporary premium start price to $100,000 -> When a name expires, it goes through a 90 day grace period, after which it becomes available for general registration. To prevent it becoming a race to register, a b temporary premiumb is attached, starting at $2000 and diminishing to 0 over 28 days. Done properly this results in a dutch auction for the name. When the premium was set, $2000 was roughly the 98th percentile of all auction prices for the short name auction, and seemed like a reasonable starting price. Today, web re seeing multiple reports of names, particularly 3 character names, being snapped up by bots the moment they become available at the maximum premium. Long-term we can improve the mechanism by setting the initial premium based on the base price of the name (so 3 letter names start off more expensive than 5+ letter names), and by introducing a nonlinear pricing curve (for example, having the price diminish by 1% per hour for 28 days). In the short term, however, Ib d like to propose setting the initial premium to a much higher value, which we can do with a simple transaction from the DAO account. Research of current trends shows: 2,798 names have been bought during the temporary premium period so far. Of these, 340 (12%) were purchased the moment they became available. Registrations of names during the temporary premium period have been on the increase since the DAO launched in November. 12 names have been purchased at a premium and flipped on OpenSea; the most valuable of these, punk.eth, went for $85,636. Accordingly, I propose increasing the temporary premium from its current value of $2,000 to a new value of $100,000. This will ensure that the start price exceeds the secondary market resale value of almost all released domains, and corresponds to a rate of decrease of just under $150/hr, meaning that less valuable domains will still have a multi-hour period during which people can purchase them before the premium expires. In parallel, work should be initiated on a new nonlinear premium model, so that high initial premiums can be combined with a slow decrease towards 0, allowing both high and low value names to be bid on fairly. Specification Deploy a new instance of the LinearPremiumPriceOracle with the initial premium set to 100,000 USD and the period set to 28 days, with other pricing variables identical to the current oracle. Call setPriceOracle on controller.ens.eth, passing in the address of the new price oracle contract.
Contract